Edward George is the Cape Verde and São Tomé author for the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and is a freelance writer on the politics, economics and history of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. By exploring the complex interplay between the fighting on the ground, the tortured peace process and the constantly shifting alliances, this book aims to explain how these forces shaped and affected Cuba’s fifteen-year intervention, propelling it towards its controversial conclusion.
Drawing on interviews with leading protagonists, first-hand accounts and archive material from Cuba, Angola and South Africa, this book dispels the myths of the Cuban intervention, revealing that Havana’s decision to intervene was not so much an heroic gesture of solidarity, but rather a last-ditch gamble to avert disaster. This book examines why a Caribbean country sent nearly half-a-million of its citizens to fight in Angola, and how a shortterm intervention escalated into a lengthy war of attrition, culminating in Cuba’s spurious ‘victory’ at Cuito Cuanavale. In January 1965 Cuba formed an alliance with the Angolan MPLA which evolved into the flagship of its global ‘internationalist’ mission, spawning the military intervention of November 1975 and Cuba’s fifteen-year occupation of Angola.
THE CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, 1965–1991